Internet Appendix A75 Aviation A75.1 Illustrative Pitch Template Example

Pitcher's Name	David Tan, Tay Koo, and David Duval	FoR	1506	Date Completed	30/11/2015
		category			
(A) Working Title	Aviation-exposed risk for tourism destinations: A method for reducing information asymmetry in destination-airline				
	relationships.				
(B) Basic Research Question	This paper develops a simple risk-ranking tool for tourism destinations (or route development teams) when negotiating				
	with airlines for new or additional services.				
(C) Key paper(s)	Halpern, N., and Graham, A. (2015). Airport route development: a survey of current practice.' <i>Tourism Management</i> ,				
	Vol. 46, pp. 213-221.				
	Halpern and Graham (2015) highlights that deregulation means airlines are more free to choose where to fly and, in				
	parallel, airports are freer (and sometimes required) to expand and economically grow as they are increasingly considered				
	to be commercial businesses rather than purely public utilities. However, to date, our paper is the first to develop a risk-				
	ranking tool that reduces the information asymmetry between airlines and airports/tourism stakeholders.				
(D) Motivation/Puzzle	Air services are increasingly negotiated between airlines and destinations. Much of the power in route development rests				
	with an airline, largely because their asset, unlike the destination (and the associated airport), is mobile and can be				
	deployed elsewhere. Recognizing the value of air services, strategic initiatives from non-airline beneficiaries of air				
	services are often necessary in order to secure and retain valuable access. Often, however, there exists a degree of				
	information asymmetry such that airlines, but not destinations, understand all too well the financial value of a destination				
	(or node) in their network. We develop a simple risk metric (using publicly available information) that reduces this				
	information asymmetry, allowing a destination to measure their risk rank within an airline's network. This ranking will				
	neip determine the degree of incentives/risk-share agreements that may be required to entice an airline to introduce new -				
THDEE	OF retain existing - services on a route.				
(E) Ideo 2	The idea is to use publicly queilable information to gain a better and dentary dimensional and the second s				
(E) Idea:	The idea is to use publicly available inform	mation to gain	a better understanding	g of an airline's capaci	ty · · · ·
	distribution/decisions. We use seat factors	s (number of se	ats sold divided by se	ats available) as the pr	imary input. As
	demand for air tickets are dynamic and fit	and yet the avai	lability of seat capacit	ty is scheduled months	s prior to departure,
	significant deviations between demand an	a capacity can	be viewed as shocks i	in demand that could n	lot be anticipated by
	the airline. We define a fisky route as of	ne where dema	ind is unpredictable by	y the airline and is hen	ce difficult to
	manage (uncertain promability). we vand	iale the measure to r	re by comparing the ad		ion of an airline and
	There is no problem of endogeneity of each	nnne were to r	minimise the risk meas	sure.	
(F) Data?	We use monthly inhound passes are done	usanty is not be	uny metred.	level for on Asia Das	ifia law agat gamier
	we use monthly indound passenger dema	nd and capacit	y numbers at the route	e level for an Asia-Pac	inc low-cost carrier.
	Because of the characteristics of low-cost	carriers - simp	he network and pricing	g structures - it is rease	Shadle to assume that

Template from Faff, Robert W., Pitching Research (2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2462059 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2462059

	they will maximise seat factors while conveniently allowing for the testing of our risk measure and its implications. It is a		
	balanced panel dataset with 7 routes over 55 months. Data is sourced from the Department of Infrastructure and Regional		
	Development. This provides the study with 385 observations which is more than sufficient for the ensuing analysis.		
(G) Tools?	In order to validate the risk measure, we use a simple portfolio optimisation to derive an optimal capacity distribution for		
	the airline if it were to minimise our risk measure. We compare this to the empirical (actual) distribution to determine		
	whether the proposed risk measure is relevant or considered by airlines in their capacity settings. We use a chi-squared		
	test of proportions to formally test the statistical similarity of the 2 distributions.		
TWO	Two key questions		
(H) What's New?	The novelty is in the idea. The premise is that we can use a simple risk measure based on publicly available information		
	that will reduce the informational asymmetry when airports/tourism destinations negotiate with airlines for route access.		
	For example, AER will provide a numerical measure of a particular route's level of travel demand risk. As such, tourism		
	destinations will be able to observe the quantitative risk ranking of their location from the airline's perspective.		
	Moreover, AER at the portfolio level allows the calculation of changes in airline-level AER due to changes in routes		
	served. That is, if an airline replaces route X with route Y, the implications for the airline's exposure to AER can be		
	calculated.		
(I) So What?	As a destination's air service consistency is determined by an airline's strategic decisions, our proposed risk measure can		
	be viewed as a valid metric that captures the extent to which the origin-destination pair is exposed to possible		
	unpredictable volatility in travel demand that is relevant to airlines. It can be useful for local stakeholder consortia		
	(including airports, local governments, tourism marketing organisations, etc.) in assessing their level of business risk to		
	the airlines especially when the stakeholders are not privy to the same set of full information airlines use to make		
	network capacity and scheduling decisions. The risk-rank will help determine the degree of incentives/risk-share		
	agreements that may be required to entice an airline to introduce new - or retain existing - services on a route.		
ONE	One bottom line		
(J) Contribution?	The first quantitative publicly available risk measure (from the perspective of an airline) for tourism destinations and		
	airports when negotiating with airlines for route access.		
(K) Other Considerations	Yes, Dr David Duval (University of Winnipeg) is an expert in tourism/aviation policy and management, and Dr Tay Koo		
	(UNSW) is an expert at air travel behaviour and modelling.		
	The target journal is Current Issues in Tourism as there is a Methods & Practice section that is a perfect fit for this paper.		
	Little risk. This paper has been workshopped and the reception from the tourism and aviation community is positive.		